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Digital ventures, start-ups growing by drawing on and adding to digital infrastructures, can scale their
business at an unprecedented pace.  We view such rapid scaling as a generative process by which a venture’s
user base increases significantly between two points in time through digital innovation.  We studied WeCash,
a Chinese digital venture, nearly doubling its user base monthly, to learn more about this generative process. 
We trace three contingent mechanisms underpinning rapid scaling:  data-driven operation, instant release, and
swift transformation.  We explain these mechanisms and how they interact in the rapid scaling of digital
ventures.  The research offers an agency perspective on scaling of digital ventures that speaks to the digital
innovation literature.  
Keywords:  Digital innovation, digital ventures, digital technology, user base, rapid scaling, case study
Introduction1
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the scaling of digital ven-
tures is qualitatively different from the type of scaling
documented by Chandler (1962) in his classic case studies of
Du Pont, General Motors, Standard Oil, and Sears.  In par-
ticular, the leanness with which digital ventures grow by
drawing on and adding to digital infrastructures (Brynjolfsson
and McAfee 2014; Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013; Yoo et al.
2010) helps to increase the clockspeed (see Fine 1998).  Some
of the dominating technology firms such as Amazon and
Google quickly reached a scale that took decades for indus-
trial companies to accomplish.  Similarly, numerous digital
ventures seek to scale their businesses rapidly, typically
driven by winner-takes-all perceptions (Eisenmann et al.
2006; Schilling 2002).  Importantly, rather than traditional
growth measures such as sales levels, profitability, and market
share (McKelvie and Wiklund 2010), the user base (Oliva et
al. 2003; Prasad et al. 2010; Sun et al. 2004) is at the heart of
such rapid scaling.  The notion of user base differs from
customer base in that a customer has “past purchase beha-
1Satish Nambisan, Kalle Lyytinen, Ann Majchrzak, and Michael Song were
the accepting senior editors for this paper.  Indranil Bardhan served as the
associate editor.
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vior” (Schmittlein and Peterson 1994), which is not neces-
sarily the case for users in the context of digital innovation.
We define rapid scaling as a generative process by which a
venture’s user base increases significantly between two points
in time (Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013; Lee et al. 2006;
Leitch et al. 2010).  The process is generative in that initial
success in building the user base (i.e., the number of people
using a digital innovation) increases the likelihood that more
users will follow (Arthur 1989; Church and Gandal 1992;
Grindley 1995; Hanseth 2000; Song et al. 2009).  However,
rapid scaling is not eternally generative but requires careful
attention by reflective agents to sustain over time (see Garud
et al. 2010).   In the case of digital ventures, we argue that
such attention involves reflective actors engaging in digital
innovation to increase the user base.  Prior research suggests
that the leeway for such engagement is afforded by digital
technology’s separation of function and form, and separation
of contents and medium, respectively (Benkler 2006; Yoo et
al. 2010).  Yet, little is known about the mechanisms by
which digital ventures accomplish rapid scaling of the user
base through digital innovation.  We therefore address the
following research question:  What are the mechanisms by
which digital ventures innovate to rapidly scale the user
base? 
We undertook an in-depth process study (Langley 1999) of
WeCash, a Chinese digital venture in the credit business,
which seemed to grow on steroids.  Nearly doubling its user
base monthly reaching 602,000 in 8 months, we studied how
WeCash innovated digitally to initiate and sustain rapid
scaling.  Our research provides a unique study of how a
digital venture mobilizes digital technology as a prime mover
to generate/initiate innovation opportunities (Nambisan 2013). 
We trace three contingent mechanisms:  data-driven opera-
tion, instant release, and swift transformation.  We explain
these mechanisms and their interrelationships, and outline
implications for research and practice.
Conceptual Basis
Our notion of rapid scaling assumes that sustained gener-
ativity requires the careful attention of digital ventures, and
that the use of digital technology facilitates such attention. 
Even though the generativity of an innovation is typically
associated with self-reinforcement “without any input from
the originator of the system” (Wareham et al. 2014, p. 1195),
human actors in digital ventures are reflective agents who are
capable of situating themselves in the context of rapid scaling
(see Garud and Karnøe 2001; Henfridsson and Yoo 2014).  In
other words, they “monitor continuously the flow of their
activities and expect others to do the same for their own”
(Giddens 1984, p. 5).  They attend to the generative process
to monitor its progress and determine how it conforms to
growth expectations.  In other words, they also actively reflect
upon possible ways to keep the momentum of the user base
growth, or to rejuvenate scaling in decline.
Unlike classic views on scaling where economics of scale is
achieved through standardization (Chandler 1962), digital
technology offers flexibility (Kallinikos et al. 2013; Svahn et
al. 2017; Yoo et al. 2012) that potentially can be leveraged
innovatively to rapidly scale the user base of a digital venture. 
In what follows, we elaborate on such digital innovation.
We define digital innovation as the recombination of digital
components in a layered, modular architecture to create new
value-in-use to users or potential users of a service (see Lusch
and Nambisan 2015; Yoo et al. 2010).  This definition mani-
fests the idea that digital innovation is both a process and an
outcome.  We suggest that the contribution of digital innova-
tion to rapid scaling can be traced to two fundamental aspects
of digital technology:  the separation of function and form,
and the separation of contents and medium.
First, unlike analog technologies, digital technology enables
a separation of contents and medium (Yoo et al. 2010).  This
means that digital contents, whether images, music, or social
media profiles, can travel across different media, as long as a
standard is followed (such as TCP/IP) so that heterogeneous
digital devices can encode the bit stream in the intended way.
It also means that, after initial design, ideas are “comparably
inexpensive to scale” (Henfridsson et al. 2014, p. 30) as their
subsequent reproduction incurs negligible marginal costs
(Brynjolfsson and Saunders 2010; Shapiro and Varian 1999).
In other words, negligible marginal costs make reproduction
costs and capabilities almost irrelevant for the speed by which
a digital venture and its reflective agents can scale the user
base.
Second, digital technology enables a separation of function
and form.  Originating in the von Neumann computing archi-
tecture and its stored-program concept (Langlois 2007), the
independence of the digitally encoded instructions making up
functions, and the digital device (form) that allows their exe-
cution, makes digital technology flexible (Yoo et al. 2010).
For instance, new functionalities can be added to a digital
product without a complete overhaul of the existing design
(Henfridsson et al. 2014; Kallinikos et al. 2013; Lee and
Berente 2012).   This makes it possible for agents in digital
ventures to reflectively reorient the innovation in search of
ways to nurture and rejuvenate the user base growth rate.
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In our quest to understand rapid scaling of digital ventures,
we respond to previous calls for research on digital innovation
(Yoo et al. 2010) and digital infrastructure (Tilson et al. 2010)
to carefully examine the nature of generativity of digital
technology as it unfolds in the hands of reflective agents.
Understanding scaling as a generative process, rather than as
a self-referential process, pays heed to the fact that digital
technology is typically “designed without fully knowing the
‘whole’ design” (Yoo 2013, p. 230; see also Garud et al.
2008).  Indeed, the flexibility afforded by digital technology
(through separations of function–form and contents–medium)
suggests the increasingly pivotal role of innovation in
nurturing generativity.  In our study of WeCash, therefore, we
trace the mechanisms that contingently lead to rapid scaling
of the user base.
Methods
We conducted an in-depth case study at a Chinese credit
rating digital venture called WeCash.  At the end of our study,
WeCash had approximately 76 employees and a monthly
turnover of 24 million RMB.  Despite its short existence,2
WeCash has been recognized for its digital innovations,
receiving awards such as Baidu’s Best Apps Award in the
design category, and named as a World Top 50 Financial
Service Innovation company jointly by AWI Venture
Australia, PWC, and Financial Services Council.
WeCash was an extreme case.  Extreme cases are “paradig-
matic of some phenomenon of interest” (Gerring 2007, p.
101), and are useful for generating theory because of their
high values on the variables in focus.  First, attracting some
600,000 users after only 8 months of operation, the firm
offered an excellent venue for studying rapid scaling of the
user base.  Second, WeCash was an exemplar digital venture
in that its use of digital technology for credit rating both drew
on and added to existing layers of digital infrastructure.  
We collected extensive data on WeCash’s rapid scaling of its
user base through digital innovation using four methods
(Table 1):  interviews, participant observation, archival data,
and informal dialogue.
In particular, we conducted 57 semi-structured interviews
with WeCash staff at different levels.  We first interviewed
the CEO and the five members of the management team
responsible for credit, marketing, products, operations, and
technology development/algorithms respectively.  We then
interviewed employees in the areas of online user service,
user experience, product improvement, user interface design,
risk control, credit assessment, artificial verification, and busi-
ness development.  All interviews were recorded, and yielded
653 pages of transcription.
The data analysis was a four-step, grounded, iterative process
(Langley 1999; Strauss and Corbin 1998), as shown in Table
2, to derive the three scaling mechanisms.
First, we mapped the monthly user base and changes in
growth rate (Figure 1) to elaborate WeCash’s growth trajec-
tory between January and August 2014.  This mapping helped
uncover specific periods of rapid growth and slow-down,
which were used as a chronological backbone to the case
narrative.  We crosschecked the user base, growth rates, and
slow-downs with the CEO.
Second, we identified and used three digital innovations as
analytical filters to furrow and categorize concepts identified
through open coding (Strauss and Corbin 1998).  We focused
on identifying each innovation’s distinctive features, enabling
digital technology, contributions to the user base, and signifi-
cant organizational and strategic outcomes.  These emerging
findings were compared with Figure 1 to construct detailed
case narratives.
The third stage of analysis was based on the principle of axial
coding (Strauss and Corbin 1998), as the emerging concepts
were iterated with the textual evidence and relevant literature. 
Central to this stage of analysis was clustering and differ-
entiating the emergent concepts to further abstract their
characteristics and empirical substance to derive the mech-
anisms of scaling.  We derived three mechanisms and labeled
them according to their empirical characteristics as data-
driven operation, instant release, and swift transformation (as
shown later in Figures 2, 3, and 4).
Finally, we focused on generating a model of rapid scaling
through digital innovation (Figure 5).  We conducted selective
coding (Strauss and Corbin 1998) to flesh out how different
scaling mechanisms interplay throughout the unfolding of the
three digital innovations.  The outcome resulting from this
stage of data analysis was a conceptual model of rapid scaling
of the user base through digital innovation.
2WeCash was founded in December 2013 as a spin-off from its holding
company, Beijing Jiufu Era Investment Consultant Co.  WeCash was a stand-
alone business, and the scaling of the user base was independent of the parent
company’s user base.  We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing
out the need to clarify this fact.
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Table 1.  Data Collection
Data Sources Total and Breakdown 
Interviews 57 interviews (mean length:  61 minutes) with 48 respondents generated word count of 680,000 (in
Mandarin)  
Participant
observation       
17 occasions, with average length of 45 minutes, include 6 project meetings, 3 workshops, 3 gate
review meetings and 5 steering committee meetings
Archival data Project descriptions, customer data base, credit assessment files, customer services log, meeting
minutes, presentation materials for investors, sales forecasts, technical specifications
Informal dialogue With the CEO and four out of the five members of the management team during our field visits,
inclduing 31 phone conversations with the CEO between April and September 2014.





1. Map the monthly user base and growth rate to construct WeCash’s growth
trajectory over an 8-month period.  







1. Identify and use specific digital innovations to filter and categorize
concepts from open coding (Strauss and Corbin 1998) by focusing on
depicting each innovation’s main features, enabling IT artifacts,
contributions towards user base growth, and outcomes.
2. Develop a case storyline to depict the recursive pattern of how each
innovation helped to generate, re-energize, and sustain rapid growth of
user base.   









1. Conduct axial coding (Strauss and Corbin 1998) to identify mechanisms
and sensitize the emerging findings in view of case evidence and relevant
literature.
2. Consider how each mechanism relates to, yet differs from, the other
mechanisms, querying:  Are the three mechanisms distinctive conceptually
and empirically?  How do they relate to each other?
3. Derive three mechanisms and each mechanism’s relevant components.




(Figures 2, 3 and 4)
4. Generate model
of rapid scaling 
1. Build on findings emerging from Stages 2 and 3 to examine how the
analytically distinctive but interrelated mechanisms work over time to
enable rapid scaling.  
2. Iteratively compare the emerging conceptual model with case evidence
and existing literature related to growth, digital technology and innovation,
querying:  Is the conceptual model capable of capturing the unfolding of
digital innovation at WeCash?  Have these mechanisms been concep-
tualized by prior accounts? 
3. Compare the newly generated rapid scaling model with literature in digital
innovation, digital technology and growth.  
4. Further enhance trustworthiness and reliability of findings by obtaining
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Figure 1.  User Base and Growth Rate
Eight Months of Scaling at WeCash
WeCash reached over 600,000 users in the 8 months fol-
lowing its establishment in December 2013, doubling its user
base almost every month (see Figure 1).  As a digital venture
in the credit business, WeCash constantly focused on how to
scale the user base.  However, its rapid scaling was not a
smooth exponential process.
It was punctuated by two short yet distinctive slow-downs in
April and June 2014 (Figure 1), when the growth rate fell
compared to previous months.  In response to each slow-
down, WeCash managed to reenergize user growth through
digital innovation.  In what follows, we present WeCash’s
rapid scaling, and use the case findings to trace how it is
contingently caused by three mechanisms:  data-driven opera-
tion, instant release, and swift transformation.  
Online Micro-Lending Company 
In January 2014, WeCash launched an online micro-lending
service that was different from other micro-lending services
in China.  The service constructed a user’s credit profile and
rating primarily based on her social media usage and online
presence.  This took only 20 minutes.  Such an improvement
in waiting time (the industry norm was 3 to 4 working days)
was enabled by radical changes to the information used and
the way loan applications were processed.
WeCash’s online service crawled and used more than 6,000
sources of data, including social media data (user-provided)
and online behavior data (sourced from over 40 organizations,
such as mobile operators and Internet service providers) to
construct users’ credit profiles and rating.  Rather than using
traditional measures such as income, assets, and spending
patterns, the service used an algorithm including 11 weighted
variables, such as occupation, position, residence, qualifica-
tions, habit, social media usage pattern, social media influ-
ence, social network, purchase power, and online bills/
receipts.  In doing this, WeCash focused on users’ willingness
to repay, instead of solely on ability to repay as most other
vendors.
There were at least two ways that made the service stand out. 
First, WeCash provided micro-loans to users who did not
have a credit history and were unable to produce documents
required to construct conventional credit profiles.  Second,
moving away from scanned documents and paperwork,
WeCash made speedy application processing into a unique
selling point.  As the Operations Manager explained,
MIS Quarterly Vol. 41 No. 1/March 2017 305
Huang et al./Rapidly Scaling the User Base of Digital Ventures
Taking 3 or 4 days to approve a loan is pretty much
the standard in this market.  When you consider how
long it will take banks to make a decision, we are
talking an even longer time frame....I suppose the
most uncomfortable part for the users is the wait.  It
is the uncertainty and anxiety that really put people
off....We were thinking “why don’t we change
that?”  
WeCash’s micro-lending service grew rapidly in the first
three months.  However, April 2014 saw a significant slow-
down in growth (see Figure 1).  Managers, who continuously
monitored the user growth, were alarmed and felt that they
needed to reshape the service to reinstate growth.  After
considering multiple options, WeCash decided to leverage its
credit rating technology by launching an online credit rating
service that targeted what they referred to as “2+5” users
(people in the range of 2 years before, and 5 years after,
university graduation).  WeCash reasoned that such users
would have strong incentives to build their credit histories.
Online Credit Rating Service
In mid-April 2014, just days after recognizing the need for
transformation, WeCash launched its online credit rating
service.  Users of the new service needed to submit their
personal and social media accounts information, and would in
return obtain a free credit rating report including interpreta-
tional guidance and suggestions on how to improve the credit
rating.  A micro-loan would then be offered if a positive credit
rating was completed.  The service was launched as the man-
agement team was increasingly obsessed with having a large
user base.  As the CEO pointed out,
Interestingly, most of the successful e-commerce
companies in China do not make money out of their
core business, but other services derived from their
core.  Nevertheless, key to this rather unusual way
of operation is a large user base.  Hence, how to
grow and retain users is undoubtedly our most
important agenda.
Consistent with this view, the online service was free, in order
to generate as large a volume of user data as possible.  The
management’s idea was that a larger user database would
enable effective machine learning and the ability to improve
the credit rating and risk assessment algorithm.  In addition,
large volumes of user data were seen as useful when
exploring ventures with existing and future data suppliers,
such as mobile service providers.  Furthermore, the data could
help improve the user experience.  As the Chief Data Officer
noted,
We hope that through the more and more powerful
background information support, we can allow our
users to provide as little information as possible.  If
their information is already in our database, there is
less need for our users to enter information.  This
could enhance the user experience.
As witnessed by WeCash’s management, the free online
credit rating service proved to be effective in growing the user
base in two different ways.  First, the service helped to attract
users curious about credit ratings but without immediate
financial needs.  Second, there was a sharp increase in sharing
across users’ social networks, in particular among the “2+5”
segment, which benefited WeCash from online word-of-
mouth for new user recruitment.
Despite the popularity (manifested in the third position on
Baidu’s mobile assistant chart in the “personal finance”
category), WeCash’s user base growth slowed down con-
siderably toward the end of June 2014.  The management
team was again alerted, and intensified its tinkering with new
designs that would help them reach the targeted user base of
1 million by the end of 2014.
Credit Note Service 
Ongoing tinkering with its technology and corresponding
reflection by the management team resulted in a third digital
innovation—a credit note service—launched in mid-June
2014.  This service was launched to stimulate repeat use, so
that WeCash could retain users more effectively.  Moreover,
this innovation was deemed to help reach larger market
segments, as nearly 500 million Internet and mobile users did
not have credit history for accessing conventional loans and
credit cards.
The new credit note service enabled users to quickly set up 
credit of up to 5,000 RMB (about $800), usable for online
shopping, various offline payments, and deposits.  Users
could purchase goods through online and affiliated offline
organizations by providing account details or QR code based
on the agreed credit limit.  The service was a personal loan,
except users did not receive any cash, but had WeCash as the
paying agent for their transactions.
This digital innovation surfaced one technological challenge,
which was to significantly minimize the time required for
generating credit ratings.  Initially, the 20-minute process for
loan decisions was an unthinkable breakthrough in China’s
credit industry.  However, for the credit note service, 20
minutes were deemed too long, since it could easily disrupt
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the flow of an online transaction.  As the product manager
explained, users had significantly different expectations for
the credit note service, and “waiting for 20 minutes was
simply not part of it.” WeCash therefore continuously
released new versions reflecting improvements in technology
including their algorithm.  While the CEO had five minutes,
or even one minute, in mind for the future, in July 2014, the
average credit assessment was down to 15 minutes.
In our research, we studied a remarkable phenomenon of
rapid scaling over 8 months.  Our analysis yielded a number
of recursive patterns in how rapid scaling of WeCash’s user
base was accomplished through digital innovation.  In what




Our data analysis revealed a distinct ability of WeCash to
generate digital innovations addressing seemingly untapped
areas of the credit market.  The starting-point of such innova-
tion was the vast amounts of data captured through user sub-
mission, in-house and common digital infrastructures, as well
as data sourced externally (e.g., National Statistic Bureau,
mobile operators, and e-commerce sites).  This was done both
to generate and frame something entirely new, and to upgrade
and refine what already existed.  We refer to this ability as the
mechanism of data-driven operation.  It depicts the process
by which digital ventures frame, hedge, and monitor innova-
tion opportunities and risks through analyzing significant
volumes of data.
This mechanism was imperative for the ways by which
WeCash challenged conventional industry norms, including
the emphasis on willingness to repay, social media-based
credit profiles and ratings, and credit note services.  It stimu-
lated WeCash to periodically reflect and transform its venture
identity.   
WeCash’s data-driven operation should be comprehended in
view of a credit industry where user data was, as described by
the CDO, “highly unstructured, largely paper-based and failed
to capture and reflect the majority of the market.”  WeCash
viewed these inherent market inefficiencies and infrastructural
constraints as unique innovation and growth opportunities.
The mechanism involves at least three distinctive sets of data-
driven activities (see Figure 2).  First, user profiling helps
identify innovation opportunities that can be progressed and
subsequently launched.  It refers to the utilization of user data
to identify and explore uncharted areas such as new user seg-
ments.  The second activity involves decision hedging, which
refers to the activities by which digital ventures use estab-
lished and novel data types for assessing the risk of its
innovation.  The third activity involves fine-grained moni-
toring of the user base data including growth/decline rates,
usage patterns, new applications, cash flow, and systems
performance.  At WeCash, a digital dashboard, using green to
indicate normal operation, red to alert bugs, amber to signpost
queues, and grey to show items-in-waiting, supplied real-time
information for weekly company meetings intended to devise
actions for maintaining rapid scaling.
Instant Release
Our data analysis showed a significant ability of WeCash to
promptly materialize and launch innovations.  This ability was
not merely reflected in the distinct breakthrough innovations
reported here, but also in the sheer amount and rapid actuali-
zation of new versions, upgrades, and added functionalities. 
We refer to this mechanism as instant release to denote the
ability by which digital ventures minimizes the time gap
between service idea and deployment by concurrently running
user-responsive service trialing and modification.  The signifi-
cance of this mechanism needs to be understood within a
market where users move on very quickly as they become
attracted by other innovations.  As WeCash’s Marketing
Manager explained, “there is a strong craving for cool things
and high tolerance of imperfection.”  Understandably, in such
a context, how innovation resources were prioritized to launch
innovations was key.
We found three activities supporting the functioning of instant
release (see Figure 3).  First, instant release involves
launching, which depicts the activities that digital ventures
undertake to consolidate and channel internal resources and
prioritize data-driven operations toward fueling the launch of
innovations.  Second, instant release is also enabled by con-
current trialing.  Such trialing involves activities of testing
different services and service versions in parallel to enable
multidimensional user feedback.  Based on the feedback,
ongoing modifications of the innovations were expected and
realized.  We also traced a third activity, which we term
reactive modification, that involves the immediate changes
undertaken by a digital venture to an established service in
view of users’ reactions and feedback.  In addition, con-
tinuous changes accumulated the need to periodically trans-
form the digital venture to reflect what they did and who they
were, which is detailed in the following mechanism.
MIS Quarterly Vol. 41 No. 1/March 2017 307
Huang et al./Rapidly Scaling the User Base of Digital Ventures
Figure 2.  The Mechanism of Data-Driven Operation
Figure 3.  The Mechanism of Instant Release
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Figure 4.  The Mechanism of Swift Transformation
Swift Transformation
Our data analysis surfaced another interesting phenomenon,
which was how WeCash managed to effectively construct
what the digital venture did three times over the 8-month
study period.  We refer to this mechanism as swift transfor-
mation, elaborated in Figure 4, to describe the ability by
which a digital technology is effortlessly contextualized to
project new value-in-use and new venturing identity.  Com-
pared with data-driven operation and instant release, the
mechanism of swift transformation occurs less frequently, and
is triggered only when a distinct effort to generate a new wave
of rapid scaling of the user base is initiated by the digital
venture.
The functioning of this mechanism is supported by three
concepts.  First, it is supported through contextualizing core
digital technology, which refers to the activities of concep-
tualizing core digital technology for a new business context.
Even though each innovation at WeCash was distinctive in its
design, all were based on the core in-house digital technology
whose architecture remained largely unchanged over the 8-
month period.  For instance, the credit-rating technology, used
for supporting micro-lending decisions, was foregrounded to
become a service on its own, then subsequently used to enable
the credit note service.  Leveraged by the contextualization of
core digital technology into different services, managers were
able to quickly come up with new values through using the
services and to make adjustments in governing the func-
tioning of data-driven operations.
Another concept, termed projecting novel value-in-use, cap-
tures how managers anticipate and manifest novel benefits of
a digital innovation to attract and engage existing and new
users.  These activities were found to be valuable for
WeCash’s managers to continuously rationalize their
launched innovations.  Third, (re)defining identity represents
digital ventures’ recurring definition of what they do and who
they are.  The continuous shifts in WeCash’s overall direction
transformed its venturing identity.  For instance, starting as an
online micro-lending company (December 2013), WeCash
then repositioned itself as an online credit rating company
(May 2014), and then subsequently to a new financial service
company (July 2014).
Implications and Conclusions
A defining feature of scaling in digital ventures is the speed
by which the user base grows.  The starting-point of such
speed is the winner-take-all perception (Eisenmann et al.
2006; Schilling 2002) materialized in an entrepreneurial spirit
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and attentiveness to slow-downs in growth rate among
reflective actors actively seeking to keep the momentum
going (see Garud et al. 2010).  This is imperative as digital
ventures compete head-to-head with heterogeneous and
distributed actors seeking to make their way on top of the
same, or overlapping, infrastructure (Tilson et al. 2010; Yoo
et al. 2012).  Our research, summarized in Figure 5, offers a
substantive look at the mechanisms underpinning attempts to
rapidly scale the user base as it played out at WeCash.3  In
what follows, we discuss the implications for research and
practice.
Research Implications
Our research contributes to the emerging digital innovation
literature (Kallinikos et al. 2013; Lusch and Nambisan 2015;
Nambisan 2013; Svahn et al. 2017; Tilson et al. 2010; Yoo et
al. 2010, 2012) by providing three mechanisms (data-driven
operation, instant release, and swift transformation) by which
digital ventures innovate to rapidly scale their user base.
Recognizing “the new organizing logic of digital innovation”
(Yoo et al. 2010), prior literature underlines the malleability
by which digital technology can be redesigned to cater for
new circumstances (Kallinikos et al. 2013; Yoo et al. 2012),
and the inclusiveness of the innovation process as digital tech-
nology’s inexpensiveness as production technology allows
many people to participate (Benkler 2006).  With these
aspects in mind, it has been suggested that digital ventures
can attract new users rapidly as generative processes kick in
(Tilson et al. 2010; Yoo et al. 2010).  However, there exist
few, if any, attempts to zoom in on the mechanisms under-
pinning such scaling and how reflective agents put these
mechanisms in action.
In what follows, we develop propositions that express the
relationships between the mechanisms and provide directions
for future research.
Data-Driven Operation
Recall that data-driven operation refers to the mechanism by
which digital ventures frame, hedge, and monitor innovation
opportunities and risks through analyzing significant volumes
of data.  Enabled by the malleability of digital technology and
the separation of contents and medium (Yoo et al. 2010), the
digital venture can then continuously monitor, cross check,
and probe user reactions to aspects related to the innovation.
Through data-driven operation, multiple data sources can be
pooled and processed almost on a real-time basis to frame
new market segments and to manage and mitigate risks and
uncertainties associated with digital innovation.  This helps
create an abundance of options in a given time period.  In this
regard, data-driven operation affects instant release by influ-
encing the frequency through which options for innovation
can be generated and progressed.
Proposition 1a:  Data-driven operation will generate
more options for innovation and subsequent launch
than operations that do not rely on data generated
through digital infrastructures.
Another important aspect of data-driven operation is how the
mechanism involves the continuous deployment of user data
to frame new areas, where, if targeted, the digital venture
hypothesizes that additional user base can be scaled.  Framing
of new areas will potentially stimulate reflective agents to
look into the heart of their activities and to what extent they
are compatible with how they view and present themselves,
as detailed in the case of WeCash.  This implies that data-
driven operations may stimulate the mechanism of swift trans-
formation, specifically initiatives to transform the digital
venture.  
Proposition 1b:  Data-driven operation will stimulate
swift transformation based on recontextualization of
core technology, projection of novel value-in-use,
and new venturing identity to a greater extent than
operations that do not rely on data generated through
digital infrastructures.
Data-driven operation is a powerful mechanism in its produc-
tion of raw material for the scaling of digital ventures.  The
raw material is a host of data, clusters, algorithms, and analy-
zing practices.  In fact, this difference in inputs suggests a
qualitatively different starting-point of value-creation than
Porter’s (1985) classic value chain, inviting future research on
the role of data-driven operation for the creation of business
value within the frame of the digital venture.
Instant Release
Our research demonstrates the abilities of digital ventures to
minimize the time gap between service idea and deployment
by concurrently running user-responsive service trialing and
3One of the anonymous reviewers rightfully pointed out that marketing
efforts by WeCash could have contributed to the increase of the user base.
We do recognize that marketing can be a necessary component in growing a
user base.  In response to this potential confounder in our study, however, we
reconnected with the CEO of WeCash to learn that, during the 8 months
studied, there was no specific marketing intervention, as in the form of
increased marketing budget and/or changed channels, designed to reenergize
user growth.
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Mechanisms Definition Components





significant volumes of data.
• User profiling:  The utilization of user data to identify and explore uncharted
areas, such as new user segments, so as to identify innovation opportunties.
• Decision hedging:  The activities by which digital ventures use established
and novel data forms for assessing the risk of its innovation.
• Fine-grained monitoring:  The activities that managers enact to comrehend
innovation performance by collecting, analyzing, and evaluating usage data
such as growth rates, use patterns, new applications, cash flow, and systems
performance.
Instant release The mechanism by which
digital ventures minimize the
time gap between service
idea and deployment by
concurrently running user-
response service trialing and
modification.
• Launching:  The activities that digital ventures undertake to prioritize, consoli-
date, and channel internal resources toward fueling the launch of innovation.
• Concurrent trialing:  The activities of testing different services and service
versions in parallel to enable multidimensional user feedback.
• Reactive modification:  The immediate changes undertaken by a digital ven-
ture to an established service in view of users’ reactions and feedback.
Swift transformation The mechanism by which
digital technology is effort-
lessly contextualized to
create new value-in-use and
new venturing identity.
• Contextualizing core digital technology:  The activities of rethinking a core
in-house digital technology for a new business context.
• (Re)defining identity:  Digital venture’s recurring definition of what it does
and what it is.
Figure 5.  The Mechanisms of Rapid Scaling Through Digital Innovation
modification.  Because of the separation between the function
(e.g., credit rating service) and the form (e.g., smartphone),
and that contents can be reproduced at virtually no cost
(Brynjolfsson and Saunders 2006; Shapiro and Varian 1999),
digital ventures, such as WeCash, can afford tinkering with
multiple services, often in parallel, and enable user-responsive
modification quickly.
Since instant release is dependent on user data, the relative
success of the services instantly released will reflect back on
the ways by which data is generated.  Reflective actors, as the
management team of WeCash elaborated earlier, will learn
from releases and prioritize activities of data-driven operation. 
Proposition 2a:  Instant release will guide short-term
priorities of data-driven operation in terms of user
profiling, decision hedging, and fine-grained
monitoring.  
Concurrent trialing of different services will create numerous
cases where anomalies are created.  As reflected in the case
narrative, anomalies can serve as the source of innovation and
a rethinking of the identity of a business.  This implies that
releasing new services will trigger reflective actors to
construct new meanings of a business, as it is manifested in
technology, value, and identity.
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Proposition 2b:  Instant release will accumulate
needs for a digital venture to recontextualize its core
technology, project novel value-in-use, and trans-
form its venturing identity.
Prior research points out how information goods offer negli-
gible marginal costs (Benkler 2006; Shapiro and Varian
1999), providing great potential for design scalability (Hen-
fridsson et al. 2014).  Our research adds to this research by
explicating instant release as a mechanism that describes how
negligible marginal cost drives rapid scaling as it minimizes
the time needed to move a service idea into the market.
Swift Transformation
This mechanism denotes the digital venture’s abilities to
effortlessly contextualize its core digital technology for
creating new value-in-use and new venturing identities, when
dedicated attempts to rapidly scale the user base are initiated.
As in any innovation, meaning-making is key, as it is integral
to the articulation of new value-in-use (Boland and Collopy
2004; Lusch and Nambisan 2015; Verganti 2009).  However,
what is distinctive to the context of digital ventures is that the
meaning-making process is interwoven with their core
technology.  For instance, the business idea of WeCash could
not be separated from the algorithm and technology that
mediated it.
The idea of what a digital venture does and what it is provides
a frame for which data is relevant and how it should be
collected.  For instance, as WeCash started to view itself as an
online credit rating service focusing on “2+5” users, data-
driven operation shifted toward young people with limited
credit records, which reshuffled priorities in data collection.
This indicates that the mechanism of swift transformation will
influence the operations of the data-intensive digital venture
by providing cognitive directions.
Proposition 3a:  The results of swift transformation
will influence the way by which digital ventures
frame their innovation opportunities, hedge their
innovation decisions, and monitor the performance
of their innovation.
Similarly, changes in the cognitive basis for how to create
new value-in-use and for interpreting their core technology
will also provide new means for thinking about instant
release.  Instant release requires ways to rationalize what
should be released, since agility feeds on programmed
behavior where little reflection is needed.
Proposition 3b:  The results of swift transformation
will impact the ways digital ventures rationalize
their efforts in launching, concurrent trialing, and
reactive modification of innovations to achieve
programmed behavior.  
Swift transformation complements prior research on identity
shifts in the context of digital transformation (e.g., Tripsas
2009) with a perspective on how identity change can come
about quickly.  The mechanism suggests a qualitative differ-
ence in pace between the digital ventures and incumbent
firms.  However, in times when digital technology is em-
bedded in physical products like cars, both rhythms (the
rhythm of the physical and the rhythm of the digital) must be
handled within the same innovation process, and future
research on this topic would be useful.
Practical Implications
Our research comes with a number of practical implications. 
First, it underlines how firms in the digital era view the user
base as a precondition for creating a customer base.  While
users do not directly contribute to the revenue of a digital
venture, a significant amount of users is a necessary condition
for making a commercially successful firm.  This fact calls for
managerial interventions to maintain a focus on the way by
which innovation is managed to generate rapid scaling of the
user base.  With a large user base in place, the space of
possible ways to monetize the digital innovation will be
greater.  Second, our research shows that slow-downs in user
growth may serve as excellent starting-points for reinvention.
Managers should, therefore, consider how to best put in place
capabilities to detect changes in growth rate.  Third, firms
engaged in digital innovation are in a useful position to
explore uncharted territory by synthesizing user data in con-
junction with other data sources for managing the market
uncertainty and mitigating the risk.  The mechanism of data-
driven operation reveals how digital ventures can effectively
manage this through improved data analytical skills and
machine learning.  Fourth, firms invest a considerable amount
of effort to grow their user base, but also need to generate
“stickiness” to ensure that users perceive the need to reuse the
service.  Activities such as launching, concurrent trailing, and
reactive modifications can be introduced and nurtured in
fostering and leveraging such generation.  Finally, even
though the malleability of digital technology sometimes is
taken for granted, managers rarely consider how to make the
organization equally malleable.  Our findings suggest that
digital ventures need to be capable of transforming them-
selves, and of constructing a venturing identity that matches
their service offering.
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Limitations and Conclusions
There are limitations inherent to our research.  First, while
WeCash serves as a great example of scaling the user base
through digital innovation, we recognize the relevance of
marketing and venture capital in stimulating and sustaining
user growth.  There certainly exist digital ventures where
innovation is complemented with significant marketing efforts
funded through venture capital.  In future research, it would
be useful to closely study the interactions between data-driven
operation, instant release, swift transformation, and such mar-
keting efforts.  Second, our study did not specifically study
how the mechanisms can individually influence a digital
venture along its scaling trajectory.  We did note how all
mechanisms were at play with reference to all three digital
innovations.  Clearly, future research could comprehensively
look into the sequences of scaling to better understand how
the mechanisms configure across time.
Despite the limitations, though, we believe that our research
on scaling the user base of digital ventures helps break new
ground in the study of growth and innovation in an era of
digitalization.  We suggest that traditional measures of firm
growth should be revisited.  We also propose that innovation
is imperative for scale, a proposition unheard of at the great
industrial enterprises rigorously documented by Chandler
(1962).  We hope that our research can stimulate further work
in the area and provide a foundation for theory development. 
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